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IN THE SOPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--DAVID M.

STAUFFER and CONNIE A.

STAUFFER,

Plaintiffs and Appellants
and Cross Respondents,

BRIEF FOR PETITION
ON REHEARING

vs.
Case No. 15468
RUSSELL CALL and VELMA CALL and
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION,

Defendants and Respondents
and Cross Appellants.

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants filed their complaint seeking specific perforrnance of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Alleging respondents'

and petitioners' maliciousness in refusing to execute deeds pursuant to that contract and irreconcilable differences between the
parties, appellants also sought an equitable partition of properties
between the parties.

Prior to trial, appellants also sought, in

the alternative, compensation for improvements rnade on portions of
the property.

This claim was later withdrawn.

Respondents answered, denying any malice or ill-intent
toward the plaintiffs, and affirmatively alleging that they had
diligently attempted to complete the negotiations contemplated by
the contract.

Respondents further asserted that the contract, as

Written ~ as contemplated by the parties, violated the Statute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of Frauds, and that parol evidence was not competent to

cure :·
Lastly, respondents counterclained for nesne rent ,
s 1c:!
those general areas to which access had been sporadically den:,

defect.

them by appellants.
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Appellants filed their action in March of 1973,
By August, 19 7 3, six depositions had been taken, including cne
(R.1~'

from each of the four parties to the initial contract.

I

et.seq.-295)
In April, 1976, respondents, petitioners herein,
for a partial summary judgment.

(R.75)

me::;

This matter was callel

for hearing on April 15, 1976; the depositions were published,j
the testimony of the appellants' surveyor was taken.
script appears in the record as the Reporter's

That tra:

Transcri~, ~:

twenty-three pages long, and ends as follows:
THE COURT:
Alright, thank you, gentlemen,
and the matter is submitted, subject only to your
filing memoranda and the Court will rule on it.
MR. BISHOP:

Thank you.

MR. HUGHES:

Thank you.

(R.296 at 22)

Subsequently, memoranda, as requested, were submitte:!
the respective parties, with appellants filing affidavits in '
opposition to the motion.

(R.77-98; 107-141; and 162-183) Ir

.

c,.j

early October, 1976, Judge Burns overruled and denied respon ·

1

motion for summary judgment, setting the matter for pretrial c
November 11, 1976.

(R.185-186;190)

The case was subsequently tried to the court on May
eleventh and twelfth, 1977.

The district judge viewed all tho
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exhibits and observed the demeanor and judged the credibility of
witnesses.

Despite sixty-three objections to the introduction of

testimony, the court took evidence and heard everythino the parties
said and did proferred by plaintiffs-appellants to r-rove their
contract.

(See Appendix)

Though respondents objected nine times

to several areas of examination on the basis of the parol evidence
rule or the Statute of Frauds, each time respondents' objections
were overru 1 ed.

(Id.)

The only testimony not received was that

proferred to show improvements, this due to the fact that plaintiffsappellants had withdrawn their claim for compensation for improvements and they conceded that the improvements were not offered to
~ow

or delineate the so-called boundaries of the parcels allegedly

~rchased.
~ncededly

(T.122:15-123:7)

Furthermore, many of the improvements

were made after the lawsuit had been filed.

So exhaus-

tive was the trial court's inquiry that midway through trial, on
recross by respondents'-petitioners' counsel, Mr. Bishop, counsel
for plain tiffs-appellants, objected to further testimony on one
alleged boundary as cumulative, indicating:
MR. BISHOP:
Objection, your Honer, that is
we have been over this four or five times.
(T. 162:4-5)
Ultimately, the trial transcript comprises 294 pages.
After plenary trial, the district judge exercised his excl~sive
provincel/ to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and found
the Uniform Real Estate Contract unenforceable.

Specifically, the

trial court noted that the document presented to the court failed

~

describe with particularity any tract of

land.~/

The parol

testimony of the parties was contradictory, and the exhibits
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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clarify~

preferred and received by the court did nothing to
ambiguity.

Plaintiffs'-appellants' main exhibit, Exhibit

.

2

'·j

shows that there are no walls and wire fences or any boundar:;;
around the two homes which enc lose any acreage.

Appellants

e':'

asserted that one parcel, bounded only on two sides by a fenc'
and designated by them as containing 18. 3 acres, was the

~

1

parcel to be retained by respondents-petitioners pursuant tot:
document drafted January 2, 1969.

Further, plaintiffs'-appe!:I

proposed boundaries for the home parcels rarely followed fence;
wal 1 s at al 1, al though a few straight and sporadically interse:j
fences are depicted nearby.

Lastly, a large fence, located

c:j

southern portion of the exhibit was not even located on the
property in question!
The trial court also found that all the parties exec:j
the January 2nd document with the expectation that boundaries

I

would be agreed upon, and that appellants moved onto the prw'
knowing these matters were unsettled.

The court further founc

that the respondents made several trips to Utah to settle the
boundaries, but that there had never been a meeting of the mine
of the parties as to the nature or extent of the boundaries' ;
location.1/
Lastly, the court noted that appellants had voli;nta::'
withdrawn that portion of the complaint alleging respondents
"unlawful, wrongful, and malicious ref'.lsal to per f orm
to the written document. ii

n

accordt:'

Al 1 the parties, the court held, ''

come before the court in good faith)/ And, while the trial
found that

respondent~

f

had knowledge of appellants
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,

s

poradic

cc.~1

occupation cf the premises, it did not find respondents had con-

I
I

sented to the same.

There is ample evidence in the record to

support that distinction.
RECORD ON APPEAL
Pursuant to Rule 75, URCP, appellants designated the
Record on Appeal on October 24, 1977.

(R.287)

Simultaneously,

they filed their certificate that a transcript had been ordered.
(R.288)

The district court clerk then transmitted to the Supreme

court the following nine volumes:

Two volumes of court records,

:j

all six depositions taken prior to the overruled notion for sum-

I

mary judgment, and the Reporter's Transcript of the summary
j~gment

proceedings.

These were all filed in the Clerk's Office

in Salt Lake City on November 22, 1977.

:j

.,,

In December, 1977, Willard R. Bishop, Esq., counsel for
appellants, checked out these nine volumes and had them transmitted to Cedar City, Utah, some 280 miles from the Court.
~b~quent

thereto, two more volumes were filed in Salt Lake City

as wpplemental to the record on appeal:

(1) An Order executed by

Judge Burns extending the time for filing the transcript of trial,
docketed on December 19, 1977; and (2) The transcript of trial,
docketed January 27, 1978.
Mr. Christiansen, Judge Burns' court reporter, provided

~lli counsel with copies of that trial transcript, so neither
counsel checked it out from the Supreme Court Clerk.

By pre-

arrangement bio;tween counsel, the nine volumes were trar1sferred
from Cedar City to St. George for •.ise incident to the preparation
of respondents'

brief.

Subsequently, by stipulation, the exhibits
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were forwarded to the Supreme Court.

The nine vo 1 urries co

the original record on appeal were not returned until Jul

mpr1,_
y, 11'

This case was set for argument on October 10, i 978 .
Justice Ellett, subsequent thereto, checked out only nine
eleven volumes of the designated record on appeal.

of~

Apparent!;·,

the last two volumes were never removed from the Clerk's offic:
The Supreme Court Opinion was filed on January 91 10 •
Pursuant to Rules 76(e) and (f) of URCP, petitioners' counsel,

., i

the basis of concurrent obligations, received an extension to'j
this brief on or before February 13, 1979.
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL

The Supreme Court, apparently due to the inadvertent 1
shevelment of the designated record on appeal, seemingly viewed
case without the benefit of the supplemental record, includinq
. 1 transcript..
6/
tria

The first paragraph of the Opinion, simi:d
I

others therein, confuses the parties and states that appellants!
respondents, were to retain approximately forty acres of farm!::,
Furthermore, the payments recited as made in that paragraph ard
incorrect.

These misstatements, however, are probably insigni'.:I
Of more significance is the body of the Opinion whk

never clearly delineates the standards of review applicable to
judgments after trial.

Noting the on-going disagreement of~

parties, the Opinion only briefly al 1 udes to the trial court':

1

I

having taken parol evidence with regard to the language of the
contract and the subsequent communication and conduct of t~
parties.

Thereafter, the Opinion takes judicial notice of ai

increase of land values in the southern

regio~

o f t he
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·tate or.

~

I

to ~potnesize that respondents could stand idly by, bargaining in
~ith

Wd
to

and hoping for a "mighty windfall."

The Opinion fails

note that the trial court explicitly rejected that hypothesis

. d.
7I
and made a contrary f in ing.-

Having once fixed the position of the parties within this
~pothesis,

the Opinion then proposes a theory of recovery, part

performance, that was never pled,
never raised on appeal.

~

tried by consent, and

Part performance, the Opinion reasoned,

takes "the matter" out of the Statute of Frauds, and is disposi tive
of the case.

Ultimately, the thrust of the reversal assumes the
existence of sufficient fences and stone walls never sh'Jwn at
trial by which the descriptive boundaries are to be located and
instructs the trial court to allow appellants their day in court
~a

take the testimony of what was said and done - something the

trial court had already exhausti veiy accomplished.

Thereafter,

ilie Opinion instructs the trier of fact to decide the legal
~~ription

of the land purchased and order the same conveyed to

appellants - this, despite the trial court's express finding that
ilioogh the parties all contemplated an agreement on the boundaries,

"oo ~bsequent agreement, oral or otherwise, was ever reached that
resolved the ambiguities ... ~!
It clearly appears that Justice Ellett felt that the
trial court had ruled on the basis of the summary judgment transcript and the other vol ume3 of the record he viewed.

The Opinion's

remand, according to one recent decision, in fact ?CStures the
,
.
. 1 .9I
Part 1· e ~~ as i· t. t h,ere nad
never zeen
a tria
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Petitioners, on rehearing, request that the
Court re-examine the

entir~

Sup~~

designated record on appeal,

Pet;

tioners request that the Supreme Court scrutinize the hvooth.
-·

nature and thrust of the judicial notice taken, and the
of taking the same without notice to petitioners.

p~~~

Petitioner:

request that the Supreme Court re-examine the standard of
mistakenly applied to evaluate this case.

"E.

r~~

Petitioners regues:

that the Supreme Court evaluate the doctrine of part performa::
which, as a prerequisite to its invocation, requires a complet;
contract and meeting of the minds, in light of the trial cour:
findings that no such event ever took place.

Petitioners reqc:

the Supreme Court to review its position as advocate in not or.:
proposing sua sponte part performance as a theory of recovery,
but, without notice or any argument thereon, finding it dispos:
tive of the case.

Petitioners request that the Supreme Coort

examine the logic of an opinion which hypothesizes the potent!:

for bad faith, and then rules as if the case before it fit the:
hypothesis.

Lastly, petitioners request that the Supreme Ccu::'

examine the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits which

clearly display the paucity of fences, walls, or other natura:,
boundaries to demarcate the alleged boundaries of appell~U'
purchases.
01 timately, petitioners seek reversal of the Opinicr
which apparently allows the district judge to create fur t~
parties a contract, previously found non-existent, and then
judicially enforce that contract as created.lQ./
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d

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is perhaps repetitious to state facts supplemental to
those found and entered by the trial court in petitioners'

favor.

Nonetheless, an overview of the facts may effectively serve to
highlight the testimony forming the basis for the lower court's
findings, insofar as the Opinion seemingly ignores them.
In 1959 the petitioners, Russell and Velma Call, purchased approximately 400 acres of property in Washington County in
an area generaly known as Anderson Junction.

':'he farm they

purchased was bisected by old U.S. Highway 91 and on each side of
~e

highway was located one house, the larger to the east con-

structed of rock, and the smaller to the west constructed of
brick.
~wadic

The surrounding area has an occasional roe!< wal 1 and some
fences.

As indicated by Exhibits D-2 and D-3, much of

the land had been used for farming, with some having been set
aside for orchards):.:!)

Irrigation water for all the land was

supplied primarily from a single wel 1.
~hough

this purchase was consummated in 1959, the Calls

never mo1red to the 1 and, nor have they ever 1 i ved on it.
In 1968 the plaintiffs-appellants visited the Anderson
Junction area while vacationing in Utah.
00 iliing

Basically they obtained

more than an idea of the general lay of the land.

Mr.

Stauffer came once again at ChristMas of 1968, but again only got
a general idea of the lay of the land.

(T.20:11-14)

On his last

trip, however, Mr. Stauffer, a real estate agent with an inactive
lice;ise, obtained some blank Uniform Real Estate Contracts ante-

c~ent to a meeting with the Calls at the latter's residence on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

January 2, 1969, in Santa Maria, California, apr;roxir.iately
miles from the subject property.

Snr

(T.17:6-12; 75:29-76:]]; ll::

23: 4)
On January 2, 1969, the parties basically sat ar

.
ounc

1

large table with Mr. Stauffer and Mr. Call the primary partic;.
pants in the preparation of the document executed that day.
(T.64:14-69; 139:11-14; 140:24-141:15; 232:20-21)
The completed contract appears as plaintiffs' Exhib::
1

17.

The conveyancing clause of the contract states as follows:
Witnesseth:
that the seller for the consideration herein I
mentioned agrees to se 11 and convey to the buyer, and the
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to
purchase the following described real property, si~a~
in the County of Washington, State of Utah, to-wit:
Andersons' Junction, more particulary described as folk"
see enclosed legal description.* Stauffers to purchase
two houses using the natural boundaries which is approxi·
mately ten ( 10) acres collectively plus approximately 1/\
water rights.
Calls to retain the fenced natural ~rn
ground on the SE South side from interstate freeway
I
(which is approximately forty acres) plus 2/5 water right;
The remaining ground SE of the old highway to be STAUFFER~
along with the two houses.
STAUFFERS to purchase 1/2 of
al 1 remaining property to be owned as tenants in common
with CALLS.

I

The above description was based on an initial assuwl
that U. S. Highway 91 ran east and west, insofar as it went frc
California to Utah.

(T.236:6-14)

All of the parties that test
I

fied, particularly Mr. Stauffer, the real estate agent, underd
that the boundaries of the parcels to be purchased by the stai;;I!

* Attached to the Uniform Real Estate Contract is a two page
document entitled "Legal Description" setting forth eight h
specifically described and surveyable parcel of land, toget ::,,
with water rights.
At trial, plaintiffs conceded t~ese de~c 0 ;,'.
tions did not de fine the property they were purchas1;ig' bu
the sum total of all the Calls' property.
(T.65:7-141
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were

U nde+-ermined,
-

(~. 6 s:7-14;

80:30-81:23; 82:27-2'1)
~,

the docu 111 ent,
~

important, and sub-iect to fu-ture negotiation.
-

STAUFFERS to purchase and Calls to sell and

and to retain,

·
parties.

Mrs.

The use of infinitives within

further evinces the precatory intent of the

S~auffer

also clearly understood and testified at

trial that the boundaries of the parcels to be purchased were
still subject to negotiation.

In reference to the January 2

meeting, she stated as follows:
We agreed to agree, because we were trying to get along.
(T.170:14-15; see also T.170:1-30)
On January 2, the Calls also understood that they would
have to come to Utah and meet with the Stauffers to work out the
boundaries.

(T.244:15-22; 266:10; see also Finding of Fact No. 5)

Insofar as Mr. Stauffer was presently teaching school rather than
selling real estate, the parties tentatively agreed to meet during
Easter of 1969 to work out the boundaries.
and 266: 17-21)

(T.66:30; 244:8-26;

It cannot be gainsaid that as the boundaries of

the property circumscribing the homes and the 40 acres to be
retained in fee by the Calls remained uncertain, the balance of
~e property description implicitly remained equally nebulous.

On February 12, 1969, appellants wrote the Calls
~dicating only that they were planning on visiting Anderson

Junction to go into the homes and do "a lot of looking around".
ID-13)

At the trial, Mr. Stauffer testified that by D-13 he

notified Mr. Ca}l of the Stauffers' plans en moving furniture
C:nd starting reno7ation of the ho;nes, prt=parato:cy to his ,,J..fe""'
occupation of the saMe.

(T.85:2-14)

The letter also requested
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that the Cal 1 s execute a notice attached thereto indicating t:,
a sale had been consummated.

Mr. Cal 1 never signed that noti:

Though Mr. Call did not expect the Stauffers to mov,
onto the property until the boundaries were settled, he disco"'!
t~~~s

during Easter of 1969 that Mrs. Stauffer had already
sion of the small home.

( T . 2 6 6 : 4-14 ; T . 3 ') : 1 9 )

At tempted neg:-

tiations to determine the boundaries at this time were fruitk
and Mr. Call returned to California, as did Mr. Staufferto'.:·i
teaching school.

thats~

At trial, though it was stipulated

made several improvements on the land, their attorney

1

also~

that the improvements did nothing to aid in the determination:
boundaries.

(T.122:15-123:33; see also T.190:9-192:20)

The

subsequent possession by Mrs. Stauffer was sporadic, both int.'
terms of time and in area occupied.

An early affidavit of Mrs.

Stauffer indicated that from August 1971 to January 1973 she
resided in California with her husband.
Stauffer testified similarly.

(R.24,~4)

(T.217:28-218:3)

At trial1:

On the dayo'.

trial, in 1977, Mr. Stauffer still resided in California ands:j
I

taught school there.

I

(T.16:26-28)

Pursuant to the docur:1ent executed on January 2, 1%' !
payments were tendered and received through September of 19Jl.:
(T.41:6-14)

To negotiate the boundaries, Mr. Call came toAnl;:·

son Junction six times,
1969 alone.

spending twenty-one days away ttoowril
j'

I

Mr. Stauffer testified on cross that Russell Ca.·

1

came up to the property two to three times a year, mainly to
settle the boundaries.

(T.245:17-20; 85:28-87:6)
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At trial Ci

testified that all of the money he had received had been expended
in making such trips.

(T.266:25-28)

Though negotiations continued, no agreement was reached
on the boundaries in 1969, or in later years.
T. 2so:23-29;

and 252:2-11)

(T.250:15-20;

The trial court specifically found

that al though discussions took place, no agreement was ever
12/

reache d . -

Sometime in late 1972 or early 1973, Mrs. Stauffer
rewrned to Anderson Junction.
~rportedly

Despite the fact that the contract

transferred only approximately l/5th of the Junction's

water rights, she filed documents with the State Engineer's
office claiming all of the water.

(T.150-151)

With her hands

already soiled by this deception, Mrs. Stauffer subsequently contacted an attorney who forwarded several deeds to the Calls,
requesting their execution of the same.
to Complaint at R.17)

(See Exhibit C attached

Mr. Call took these deeds to a civil

engineer and, upon seeing what they described, refused to execute
them.

Thereafter a survey map "commissioned by and prepared for

the Stauffers" was mailed to the Calls, with a second demand that
the Calls execute deeds upon the threat of litigation.

(R.17-18)

At trial Mrs. Stauffer testified that her survey as
Platted followed little piles of rocks placed on the property in
1972 by her and Mr. Call in an excursion over two hours long.

IT.1~-~; 132:12-13; 133:2-134:3)

Unable to explain

the inconsistency between this story and her prior statements
under oath, on cress examination, she admitted that some of the
boundaries were set arbitrarily by her surveyor.

(T.ll2:7-9;
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135:22-136:5; and 158:19-27)

Mr. Gale Day, Mrs. Stauffur•

----'---=:....:::..::~~~

surveyor,
was never called at trial to corroborate n'e r story,
Conversly, Mr. Call categorically and emphatically denied suer
field trip.

(T.252:20-27; 252:28-253:5; and 253:30-254: 6) :>.,,

trial court specifically rejected Mrs. Stauffer's story wheni·
found that no agreement was ever reached resolving the ambiguc
land descriptions.

Finding No. 7.

The principal problem with the Stauffer survey

is~

it unilaterally supplies descriptions neither amicably settleq
contained in the Uniform Real Estate Contract of 1969, in vioil
of the parol evidence rule . ..!1 1

Furthermore, as platted, the

survey expresses little more than the Stauffers' self-interest,
and a very real proclivity of Mrs. Stauffer for overreaching.
but one example, both Stauffers maintained throughout trial fr

i

the 40 acres of farmland to be retained by Calls consisted of,

I

parcel platted by their surveyor as containing only 18.30 acw
(T.83:19-23; 98:11-16;

~

D-2*)

Examination of the Stauffer survey reflects the part:l
I

discovery during Easter of 1969 that there are no fences or nd
boundaries which effectively enclose any area as designated inj
document of January 2, 1969.

Further, while the Opinion indid

that natural boundaries consisted of stone walls and wire fen"'.
examination of this survey, coupled with the Stauffers' testirl

J

reveals that few of the boundaries on the parcels as platted
followed any such demarcation.

Around the small house, for

ex

ex'i
* Note that D-2 and P-18 both depict the Stauffer surveY 1 .,'1'
for different markings put on them during the course of tna
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not one of tl-:e boundaries of parcel 1 follows a fence or wall.
A parcel 3.dJacent to the

small house (parcel 2) has only one

boundary co-extensive with a fence or wall, and in that iTlstance
:ails to fol low the same when such wall curved to the southeast.
Mr. Stauffer recognized these problems and further clarified that

many parts of the boundaries had never been discussed.

(T.73:9-

28)

The land around the large house (parcel 3, as designated
by the Stauffers) was also arbitrarily designated.

its boundaries follows a

fence,

located by the surveyor.

While one of

the other three were arbitrarily

(T.82:4-15)

A lengthy fence shown to

the south of both D-2 and P-18 was located on property owned by
Owen Cot tam.

At trial Mrs. Stauffer was cross exaI"lined relative to P94, an illustration she prepared representing her pictorial

understanding of the boundaries in 1971.

The differences between

her drawing and the survey prepared for her by Gale Day in 1972
are striking by comparision.
While Parcel No.

(See P-24; and T.172:22-176:21)

4 as reflected on D-2 and P-18 is not

bounded entirely by fences,

those exhibits fail to show another

fence to the north and east of that parcel, which is depicted on

a survey prepared for the petitioners by Marion Malnor, a licensed
surveyor.

(D-3)

All of the parties were aware of this fence, and

the appellants knew that the property within the same had been
farmed, perhaps even by Peter Anderson, the original owner.
IT· 92: 18- 2 8 ; 9 3 - 9 5 ; 9 7 : 6 ;

9 8 : 2 9 - 9 9 : 7 ; 1 3 3 : 2 6-1 3 4 : 6 ; and 1 6 7 : B- 3 0 l

T~~h the outer fence ~ook in some B.L.M. ground, the app~lla~ts
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could never accept Calls' position that it was this

~n~

enclosed the 40 acres of farmland he wished to retain.

t'
na:

Notao:,

using a ridge to the east of old U. S. Highway 91 as one boun;:
·1

the same having been used by appellants in their designation
parcel 4, the area designated by Call, less approximately Sad
1

would have comprised approximately 42.93 acres.
The survey prepared by Mr. Mal nor, nonetheless, is i.'

.,

as objectionable as the survey prepared by Gale Day.

As draft,!

it re fleets nothing more than a surveyor's interpretation

Of(!
i

possible description under the terms of the contract.

At tria:I

petitioners preferred that Marion Malnor would testify

~~4

familiar with the land, it was, nonetheless, impossible fur~
survey anything on the basis of P-1 7, the Uni form Real Estate :
Contract dated January 2, 1969.

It was further proferred that

Mal nor would testify that both surveyors' descriptions were
possibilities under the document and neither could be said to::
:

Understanding the thrust of thi:j

more accurate than the other.

testimony, appellants waived their right of cross examination
the proffer was accepted.

J

(T.276:30-278:2)

As neither party would accept the other's designatic~
boundaries, litigation ensued.

During the litigation Mr. and ..

Call, who could ill-afford the travel and expense, quit-clairne!
whatever interi:!st they had to Sunset Canyon Corporation, whicn·
solely owned by Dexter Snow of St. George.

Sunset Canyon cor~·

tion t·ook the property subject to whatever interest the plaint::
had purchased and not in derogation of their title.

( T. 267:20·

. rst pretri''.!
Negotiations continued, but broke down a f ter the fl

1
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Trial took place on May 11 and 12, 1977.

;975.

pro f

The testimony

erred therein only accentuated the ambiguity of the January 2,

1969 , document and made patently obvious the disagreement between
the parties.

This, the court so found.

BASIS FOR PETITION
POINT I
THE OPINION VIOLATES RULE 12 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, OF THE
CONS7ITUTION OF UTAH IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF A MATTER NOT THERETOFORE SO NOTICED IN THE
ACTION WITHOUT AFFORDING THE RESPONDENTS A
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT INFORMATION
RELEVANT TO THE PROPRIETY OF TAKING SUCH JUDICIAL NOTICE AND TO THE TENOR OF THE MATTER SO
NOTICED.
The Due Process Safeguards

A.

The Utah Rules of Evidence were adopted by the Supreme
Court to be effective July 1, 1971, pursuant to the rule-making
~ftr

entrusted to the Court by Section 78-2-4 of the Utah Code.

Rule 12 ( 4) of those Rules specifically refers to those standards
oi due process afforded all parties prior to a reviewing court's
taking judicial notice.

In particular, that Rule states as

follows:

A judge or reviewing court taking judicial notice under
paragraph ( 1) or ( 3) of this rule of matter not theretofore
so noticed in the action shall afford the parties reasonable
opportunity to present information relevant to the oroerietx
of taking such judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter
to be noticed.
(Id., emphasis added)
The salutary purpose of the above Rule becomes clearly
evident from this case.
ijJh

Embodying those standards of due process

affordable to litigants under Article I, Section 7 of the
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Utah Constitution, the Rule essentially precludes

appella~

advocacy affecting vested rights without the opportunity fur
interested parties to be adequately heard.
In the instant case, the Opinion's author, sans

a~

hearing, took judicial notice as follows:
This Court takes judicial knowledge of the fact th t
land values in the ~rea increased greatly since the con~ro:
was made.
By refusing to agree on the exact description,
the land sold and in which plaintiffs were placed in posse·
sion, the seller could hope for a mighty windfall by se11':
it at its enchanced value to others.
·
The phrase in Rule 12, "the tenor of the matter to be noticec",
particularly applicable to the above paragraph of the Court's
Opinion.
Edition,

Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridge
(1976) defines "tenor" as follows)i/

(1) General course or strain; general direction; rno~m
continuance; (2) general character or nature; (3) thrt
course of thought which holds on or runs through the whole
a discourse; general course; drift or direction of though:
purport; sustance.
In the above instance, the notice taken serves only::
introduce a tainted theoretical situation, Justice

Ellett:~ I

sponte postulating petitioners' possible refusal to bargain
good faith.

in i

Beyond re-posturing the previously innocuous.equi·1

table position of the parties, the Opinion's judicial notice
surprisingly assumed a hypothetical situation contrary to an
express finding of the trial court, which states:

I

1

I

ast.~1

The Court finds that there was a justifiable dispute
the existence of the boundaries, that payments were ma~e 1~
kept under the contract, and that both plaintiffs andf ettl
ants asserted their claims before this court in good ai ·
(Finding No. 13, P.261)
I
1

I
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

B.

~he

Thrust of Actual Bad Faith or Fraud

In State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951),
inion drafted by Justice Crockett held that the value of peran Op
sonalty about which no evidence had been preferred could not be
·udicially assumed in reaching a legal conclusion.

Nonetheless,

in Flick v. VanTassell, 547 P.2d 204 (Utah 1976), this Court indicated it might, on rare occasions, examine things outside the
record if an obvious injustice or fraud would otherwise occur.

-

see also Paetross v. Board of Commissioners, 555 P. 2d 281 (Utah
1976) •

The applicability of actual bad faith to real estate
contracts otherwise uncertain has long been recognized by the Utah
supreme Court.

In Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915)

the Supreme Court in the body of its discussion quoted Roberts on
Frauds, §135, as follows:
To cal 1 anything a part performance, be fore the existence of
the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be part
performance is established, is an anticipation of proof by
assumption, and gets rid of the statute by ju~ping over it,
for the statute requires proof and prescribes the medium of
proof.
Thereafter, however, the Adams Court intimates that the foregoing
statement of law may not be hard and fast under peculiar circumstances.

146 P. at 466.

Further, that the Statute of Frauds will

not be employed to shield a fraud is an oft-quoted maxim in the
law.

Courts unerringly, however,

fail to postulate whether bad

Wlli would breathe certainty into a description otherwise uncertain, or rather simply give rise to an action at law for damages.
Regardless, while factual circumstances of bad faith might excuse
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some extrajudicial examination with notice to the parties
I

speculation on bad faith or possible fraud, even when inv·t
l

f

ed:

the litigants, has been sagaciously rejected by this Court.
Pioneer Finance

&

Thrift Co. v. Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P.:

389 (1968).
C.

The Indefensible Use of "What If" In the DecisionMaking Process
As indicated by Justice Wilkins in dissent, "[t)he

suggestion in the majority opinion that the sellers refused tc
agree in bad faith and in hope of windfall profit is simply un·'
justified by the evidence."

Further, that suggestion is expre;:

contrary to the trial court's finding, which is amply supporte;i
the record.

Such judicial notice as taken here seemingly sern:'

but one purpose and that is to place the parties before the Co[
in a hypothetical situation as if bad faith had occurred and ttJ
to rule by so positioning the parties.

E. Wayne Thode, profes;I

I

of law, has indicated that the use of a hypothetical case to
·
·
f ac t
d e t ermine
cause in

·
· d e f ensi·bl e .lS/
is
in

~h e th rus t of Pr0·'11r

T

Thode' s criticisms in the area of tort law is no less applicab:,;

I

I
I

here; judicial inquiry is not illuminated by postulating what
might have happened under other circumstances and then rul~

1

as if those circumstances had occurred.
It should be further noted that the Opinion, while
taking judicial notice of present land values, fails to take
notice of what those values were in 1969.

It is equally pJausi:

that Mr. Stauffer, having recently been to Utah prior to Janua~i
2, 1969, and having held a real estate license, had peculiar
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knowledge enabling him to construct a bargain unconscionably
~vorable

to himself.

The comparison of land values, however,

never came up at trial because the issue of bad faith was never
appropriately presented to the court, the facts clearly showing
~at

petitioners came to the court with clean hands and in good

faith.

D.

See Finding No. 13, R.261.
The Duty of the Appellate Tribunal
The Opinion's taking of judicial notice without affording

the petitioners an opportunity to be heard cannot be passed off as
~mless

error.

The thrust of that notice colors the entire

Opinion; to reach the same result, but delete the offensive paragraph on rehearing, would do both this Court and the parties litigant a gross injustice.

Justice Benjamin Cardozo, speaking for

the Supreme Court of the Onited States, and construing provisions
similar to the due process clauses of the Otah Constitution,
indicated that the necessity of a hearing prior to an appellate
court's taking judicial notice is one of the "rudiments of fair
~~assured

to every litigant."

Utilities Commission, 301

o.s.

Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public

292 at 304-305 (1937).

Ohio Bell

subsequently formed the basis of the advisory comments applicable
~~le 20l(e)

of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which closely

parallels Rule 12(4) O.R.E. applicable in this jurisdiction.
Again, the pejorative nature of the judicial notice
taken on appeal cannot be ignored.

The indication that the sellers

~id!_y b:z waiting _for ~~indfall assumes an underlying scheme
d'

lrectly contrary to the record and the express findings entered

~ ~e trial court.

A careful reading of the Opinion reveals that
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to its advocate-author, the hypothetical case became that

Posi:

in which the parties were fixed and affected the ul tiriate dis~c.
tion of the case.

No notice regarding the nature and tenor

0

,

those matters judicially noted was ever tendered to petitione::
their counsel.
In summation, the Utah Constitution and accompanyina
code charge the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court
I

with administering, and creating where necessary, a vast bodyc·.
substantive and procedural law by which it creates a tradition·
justice in the State of Utah.

The Utah Rules of Evidence adopt

in 1971 prescribe a system of evidentiary rules by
standards were afforded parties litigant to avoid
injustice.

which~·
surprie~

Most of these rules prescribe the standards by whic'

the courts control its officers in their efforts to afford thei:
clients a day in court and empower the judiciary to limit,

Jar~:1

based on a long and developing tradition of common law, the int:
duction of evidence that might be false, unsubstantiated, withe.
foundation or only marginally relevant.

A few,

among them Rule

I

12, exemplify those very notions of "notice" and "an opportunit
.I
to be heard" by which the very meaning of justice is both manGl!j
I

and measured.

Should the Utah Supreme Court, at this juncture, i

there fore, choose to ignore or otherwise bypass the thrust of t'I
Rule, then the essence of the same, though embraced with words,!
will be emaciated by action.

SiMply stated, the Opinion's

notice, and the tenor or fair import to be derived thereo

iud

f 1 un·

I

fairly characterized my clients and create d an ambl. ent in whic~
in fact tr.',
the Opinion ruled as if something had occurred When
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trial court found it had not,

As an officer of the Court, I ask

:or a r ehearing of this entire case, or, in the alternative, an
opportunity to be heard, pursuant to Rule 12, pertaining to the
~wre

and tenor of the judicial notice which colored this Opinion.
POINT II
THE SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD
OF REVIEW TO THIS CASE ON APPEAL DUE TO THE
INADVERTANT DISHEVELMENT OF THE DESIGNATED
RECORD ON APPEAL.
As stated earlier in this brief, two volumes of the

designated record on appeal were never removed from the Clerk's
office.

One of those two volumes was most likely the trial tran-

script supplementally filed in January of 1978.

The Court's

discussion of the evidence below can be extracted largely by
reference to the briefs and the other nine volumes initially filed
with the Court.

The Opinion's thrust, however, was to afford the

appellants their day in court, something that had already occurred.

It is inconsistent that Justice Ellett would knowingly only partially review the record; and procedurally he would not require
a case to be re-opened had he known al 1 the evidence was in.
A further comparison of the standards of appellate review will
reveal that Justice Ellett inadvertently felt that on the record
before him, this case had been submitted after summary judgment.
A.

Appeals After Plenary Trial
First, petitioners recognize that in equity, pursuant to

Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme
Court may review both the facts and the law.

Nonetheless, on

appeal after trial, the Court will generally defer to the trial

----
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court's findings.

BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, No. 15593,

fji,.
'·.

October 24, 1978; Foster v. Blake Heights Corporation, SJO
815 (Utah 1974).

p·
''·

This standard has been variously phrased ft:·'

drawing all inferences from the evidence in a light favorable·
the findings to simply assuming the trial court believed that
portion of the evidence which supported its findings and susta.
ing the lower court's judgment, if possible, on any legal grci;:·
applicable from the record.
Secondly, trial courts are al lowed exclusivity in ru:J
on the credibility of witnesses.

Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 1f:

332 P.2d 981 (1958); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d,
(1962).

Furthermore, as appellants waived cross-examination

regarding respondents'

surveyor's preferred testimony that

ne::·

parties' survey, which surveys were radically different, could
said to better describe the property contained in the documen:

I

drafted January 2, 1969, the lower court's findings in accord:::
with that testimony are unassailable on appeal.

Russell

M.

f'i:1

Co. v. Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380, 325 P.2d 908 (1958).
i

Matters beyond the record are not considered, nor arc !
1

theories not presented below and raised for the first time on
appeal.

See Point IV, infra; Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 1'

P.2d 598 (1970).

B.

Appeals From Summary Judgment
In contrast to the above, in appeals from sumr.iary

i

men ts, largely based on the salutary principle that parties st.c'
not be summarily denied their day in court, all inferences are:
I

drawn in favor of the losing party.

As succinctly stated in, ..
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earlier decision,

the pertinent inquiry

is whether under anv view of the facts the plaintiff
It is acki'.10wledged that in the face of a
motion for dismissal on summary judgment, the plaintiff is
entitled to have the trial court, and this court on review,
consider all of the evidence which plaintiff is able to
present and every inference and intendament fairly arising
therefrom in the light most favorable to him.
(Abdulkadir
v. western Pacifi5 Railroad Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, at 57, 318
P.2d 139 ( 1957) . ..:!:._ 1

~o~ld recover.

On appeal from summary judgments, any plausible theory,
even if raised for the first time, may be considered if fairly set
furili in the substance of the pleadings and affidavits.

Rich v.

~,

551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 1976).

J~~ents

on appeal, this Court must conclude there is no unresolved

Similarly, to afffirm summary

issue of material fact, the solution of which would be required for
the verdict as rendered and judgment.

National American Life Ins.

Co. v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26
(1965).

Alternatively to that requisite finding, the Supreme

Court must remand the matter for trial.
C.

Procedural Posture of the Opinion
An analysis of the Opinion in light of the above is en-

lightening.

While summarily reciting the essence of the trial

court's findings,

the Opinion fai 1 s to indicate that there was na

evidence to support the same or further delineate where the lower
court erred in taking or refusing testimony to support contrary
conclusions.

Instead, the Opinion infers the possibility that

Petitioners might have idly refused to agree to a final description of properties in bad faith.
shi-ft·ing inference,
·

Once having imaqined this equity-

. .
the Opinion
then proposes a theory of recovery

net raised in the pleadings, not presented to the lower court by
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consent, nor presented on appeal, part performance.
the Opinion remands the case, instructing the trial
testimony as to what the parties did and said.

Ultimate:

.
court to ti

This has alre,!
'1

occurred, and all litigants rested.

1

i

Clearly, Justice Ellett did not, when drafting this
Opinion, have the trial transcript before him.

I

Instead he ru>

that appellants, having been denied their day in court, shouli,
afforded the same, and thereafter instructed the lower court :·j
what legal theory it could grant specific performance.

This(!

should not knowingly compound that initial and inadvertent er;,
by refusing to rehear this matter.
POINT III
THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR
OF LAW IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
A.

The Doctrine of Part Performance does not take
"matters" out of the Statute of Frauds.
Utah has long recognized the doctrine of part perfor·

mance.

Its application, however, has been used only in accorcct

I

with the principle that as a prerequisite to its invocation,a[
contract between the parties must first be shown.
Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148

~5

For example,,

( 1915), the defendant, I

resisting ejectrnent, produced the following agreement in writ!':
October 19, 1907. Received ofH. W. Manning$30as.:.
payment of 30 acres of land.
Price to be $100 for said''
D. c. Adams
The defendant testified at trial that he went into pos~ss~
1907, and had used the land consistent with its only purpose,
I

pasturing of anir.ials.

The trial court accepted Manning
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5

.·I

ev. i

and awarded him a decree of specific performance.

The Utah Supreme

court, however, noting that Adams had owned more than 30 acres in
1

~e
ti~

vicinity, held that plaintiff's contention that the descripcontained in the memorandum was insufficient "must prevail".

Pertinent to the defendant's reliance on part performance, the

-

Adams Court stated as follows:

The first essential, therefore, is to establish that there is
a contract.
Since the receipt referred to is utterly insufficient to establish a contract, it must be established by
other competent evidence.
Has respondent produced evidence
by which a parol contract of sale is established with the
clearness and precision which is required in courts of equity
where specific performance of parol contracts respecting the
sale of real estate is sought? All the authorities are to
the effect that such contracts must be clearly established,
and we are firmly committed to that doctrine.
148 P. at 466.
The Adams Court then issued the following caveat regard-

~g

the admission of parol evidence to establish contracts otherwise

violative of the Statute of Frauds:
[U]nless the courts are very careful in the admission of
parol evidence and in acting upon the mere inherent probability as such appear to the courts, they will, in equity,
enforce parol contracts which are clearly within the statute
as readily as courts of law enforce all other contracts and
will thus entirely fritter away the statute of frauds.
The thrust of Adams clearly is that clear and certain contracts,

not "matters", are taken out of the statute by part performance.
The caveat in the Adams case relative to taking parol testimony to
~~rwise establish an uncertain contract has been reduced in
~furence to land descriptions to a rule of evidence in the State

ofotah.

In Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026,

ll973), this Court stated that rule succinctly as follows:

Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to supply, a
description of lands in the contract.
Parol evidence will
not he admitted to complete a defective description, or show
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the intenton with which it was made.
Parol evidence
· a enti~ying
· ;= ·
used for the purpose of i·
t h e description cmav·:
in the writir.g with its location on the ground, but no~t'.
the purp<?se of as7ertaining and 107ating the land abo~t .;'.
the parties negotiated, and supplying the description th·
which they have omitted from the writing.
There is a ;:
1
distinction between the admission of oral and extrinsi~ ·
evidence for the purpose of identifying the land describ;
and ap~lying the ~escription to t~e ~rop~rty, and thu~
supplying and adding to the description ::.nsufficient and·
on its face.
'
In the instant case, though parol evidence was libera
introduced over objection ,12 1 the parol evidence received only
highlighted the insufficiency of the contractual description,:
intent to negotiate boundaries, and the continuing disagreement
the parties.

Trial, in fact, revealed little more than the pat

city of contiguous fences on the ground and that the parties
vigorously disputed the areas referred to in the contract of
purchase.
The fact that appellants in the instant case sporad·
ically occupied two homes on opposite sides of old U.

s.

Highwa

91 located at Anderson Junction does not aid, as Justice Ellet'
suggests, a judicial deterl'!1ination of what approximate 10 acres
with those two homes.
taken ".

For, as stated in Adams, possession must

. . in pursuant of the parol contract proved; that sue

possession was notorious; that it was exclusive and of the~
tract of land which was the subject of the contract . · ·"·
P. at 467 (emphasis added).

rn

A perhaps clearer statement of~

foregoing doctrine is found in Campbell v. Nelson, 102 Utah Ji,
d'1fi'
125 P. 2d 413 at 415 ( 1942), wherein the Utah Supreme Court "

entiates acts of part performance from the establishment of the
contract itself as follows:
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until the parties have agreed as to the terms, there is not
an enforceable contract in fact, and partial performance
cannot make up for the deficiency in the understanding
"between the parties.
(Id., emphasis added)
Clearly, as the boundaries were subject to negotiation,
~s~ssion

of the homes does not aid in their discovery.
Again, the threshold question is one of contract, and

the~

Court's citation to Roberts on Frauds, Section 135, is

particularly enlightening.
To call anything a part performance, before the existence of the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be
part performance is established, is an anticipation of proof
by assumption, and gets rid of the statute by jumping over
it, for the statute requires proof and prescribes the medium
of proof.
As to the standard of proof required for specific performance of
such contracts, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Otah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491
at 493 (1967) sets the Utah standard:
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and
ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be
~pplied by the ccurt.
It must be sufficiently certain and
definite in its terms to leave no reasonable doubt of the
specific thing equity is called upon to have performed, and
it must be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the
court may enforce it as actually made by the parties.
A
greater degree of certainty is required for specific perfurmance in equity than is necessary to establish a contract
as the basis of an action at law for damages.
Part performance, is, thus, not a doctrine without a
rationally limited application.

The Utah Supreme Court has

~~~ed the universal principle that only when the parties' minds

have met and part performance thereafter occurred may their contract be removed from the Statute of Fraud's proscriptions.
Acceptable evidence pertaining to the tract itself may identify,

out not supply, the tract's description.

Acts of part performance
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are not a substitute for the prerequisite meeting of the mind,.
recent case, Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P. 2a
611
(Utah 1975), is perhaps the most precise statement to date o'.:·
doctrine's breadth and applicability.

In a unanimous opinion

drafted by Justice Maughan, and with deference to a well-reasc::
note in the Utah Law Review, the Holmgren Court stated as fol::,
An analysis of our statute, with its qualifying companion allowing specific performance, in the decisionsc'
this court, most of which, to 1964, are noted in Vol. 9 \
1, Utah Law Review, p. 91, give us criteria describing,.
conditions, which must necessarily exist before an oral
contract for the sale of an interest in land can be enfor::

The oral contract and its terms must be clear, defin::
mutually understood, and established by clear, unequivoca:
and definite testimony, or other evidence of the same gua: 1
In addition, there must be acts of part performance which.
equity are considered sufficient to take the case out of:
statute of frauds:
( l) Any improvements must be substantr
or valuable, or beneficial.
(2) A valuable consideration:
demanded by equity.
(3) If there is possession, such poss;
sion must be actual, open, definite, not concurrent with:·
vendor, but it must be with the consent of the vendor. l'I'
Such acts as are relied on must be exclusively referrable:
the contract.
Justice Maughan's opinion is no less applicable today, t~ n~
stance thereof no less accurate.

As stated in 73 Am.Jur.2d

"Statute of Frauds" §401:

Since the doctrine of part performance had its origin in ..
equity prior to the statute of frauds, it is not surpnsu:.
to find that the doctrine can be asserted to secure specif..
performance of a contract of which there is no memorandum::
writing, as required by the statute, only where the circu;:
stances of the case meet the general prerequisites to equ;.
table relief.
Courts of equity decline to enforce a pare:,
agreement for the sale of real estate on the ground of P~:;~
performance unless the case is clearly within ~he recog~;;
principles of equity jurisprudence. The doctrine opera ae'
if, but only if, the remedy of law by a recovery of d~rn~·,,
or otherwise is inadequate and the contract is one whic ·
in writing would be enforceable in equity.
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The contract must be fully made and completed in every
respect except for the writing required by the statute, in
order to be enforceable on the ground of part performance.
The parol agreement relied upon must be certain, definite,
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal in its terms, particularly where the agreement is between parent and child, and
it must be clearly established by the evidence.
The requisite
of clear and definiteness extends to both the terms and the
subJect matter of the contract.
In light of the foregoing,

it is impossible to reconcile

the following two excerpts from the Opinion filed by this Court on
January 9, 1979; one stating a fact,

the other, this Court's

conclusion on appeal:
During the four years after execution of the document noted
ante [P-17], the parties attempted to reach agreements about
the description of the land which was sold to the de~endants
[sic, plaintiffs).
Buyers and sellers each set forth proposed
legal descriptions, but neither would accept the other's
designation.

The taking of possession and the payment of $6,400 towards
the full price takes the matter out of the statute of frauds.
B.

The trial court, on the basis of overwhelming
evidence, specifically found that no agreement,
oral or otherwise, was ever reached between the
litigants resolving the boundaries.
Petitioners ask this Court to re-examine the statement

of ~cts recited herein, the testimony of the parties, and the
exhibits on file as part of the designated supplemental record.
The lower court,

after hearing all of the evidence preferred

relative to the determination cf boundaries, and the intentions
and subsequent acts of the parties relative to the January 2nd
document, entered a specific finding which is decisive e>f the
'PPlicabili ty of the part performance doctrine.

Finding N0. 7

states as follows:
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The Court finds that Russell Call made several tri
each year between January 2, 1969, and the filing p~ to·
laswuit in March of 1973, and that on several occao· tr.::
boundaries were discussed, but no subsequent agrecmsions :
'
-~
or ot h erwise,
was ev2r reached that resolved the amb·
'· 1
R. 260.
igu::
On appeal, to dispi.ite that finding, this Court mus:'.
elude that there is no evidence in the record to support it,,
.,
that all reasonable minds would so find.
Robertson v. Hutcn::
560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).

Clearly, no contract can be prove·!

the Opinion's language that acts of part performance take "t:,
matter out of the statute of frauds" is, at best, improvident
Further, the Opinion's zeal in reaching a result ot'.
I

cates the problematic descriptive language with the followinc,
commentary:
It is clear that the Stauffers purchased the two r.c•
and the land about them within natural boundaries amount:
to approximately 10 acres.
It is also clear that then:
chased all of the land on the south side of the freeway,!
and except the fenced farm ground amounting to approxfoa:
40 acres, together with 2/Sths of the water rights. It:
also clear that the Stauffers purchased one-half of all·
the remaining property of Call, which was to be held as
tenants in common.
I

The above simply misstates the January 2nd document's divisic:,
water rights and directional references therein.

Furthermore,!

sufficient natural boundaries are non-existent, even as liberi

I

defined by Justice Ellett, the issues of which 10 acres arour:I
homes as well as which 40 acres to be retained become the fee•.
point of the lawsuit.

Even the appellants had some self-ser:r

difficulty with the description.

I
1

At trial, they asserted thr!

4 0 acres clearly to be retained by the Cal 1 s meant little mor'
t h an a parce 1 'ooun d e d on two si· d es b y a f ence and on the othe::
a sloping ridge comprising approximately 18.3 acres.
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The parties' minds never met.
determined.

The boundaries were never

Part performance as a doctrine is inapplicable.
POINT IV

THE SUPREME COURT'S SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION OF
THE DOCTRINE OF PARTEJERFORMANCE, EVEN WERE THAT
DOCTRINE APPLICABLE, VIOLATES LONG-STANDING PRECEDENT REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Contracts for the sale of interests in land under Section 25-5-3 of the Utah Code are void unless there is a writing,
complete in al 1 its material terms, subscribed to by the vendor.
~is

statute, commonly known as the Statute of Frauds, is basically

substantive, not procedural.

The material terms of such contracts

have been variously described.

According to Pomeroy, the five

essential features of a contract for the sale of land are parties,
subject matter, mutual promises, price, and consideration.
Specific Performance of Contracts, §87 (3rd Ed. 1926)
71Am.Jur.2d "Specific Performance", §34 (1973).

~

Pomeroy,

see also,

Nonetheless, the

doctrine of part performance has been commonly used to circumvent
the Statute of Frauds when the courts can otherwise ascertain a
clur, unambiguous and mutually understood contract between the
parties.

Such a contract, however, must be established by unequi-

vocal and definite testimony.
534 P.2d 611

Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard,

(Utah 1975).

In the instant case, appellants

~

pled, even through

Pre-trial, the doctrine of part performance as a bar to petitioners'
defenses properly be fore the trial court and framed under the
Statute of Frauds.

The doctrine of part performance was furthe:::-

~t hied by consent to the trial court, and insofar as the
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district judge found that there had never been a meeting oft~.'
minds on one of the essential elements of the contract

'

th

e Pr'

requisite to the applicability of the doctrine was lacking, c
appeal, neither counsel raised or discussed the doctrine.

~hE

Supreme Court, however, sua sponte, stated as follows:
The taking of possession and the payment of $6, 400 towarai
the full purchase price takes the matter out of the stat'Jt
of frauds.
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the princ:
that defenses not properly before the trial court nor

refun~·

in assignments of error could not be raised on appeal.
Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940).

Thus, issues, newly

proposed after trial, were axiomatically not considered
18/
Court.-

~

~tlh

The issue of judical consideration of newly raised

defenses, however, normally came as a result of zealous
raising the same on appeal.

cooM~

Meyer v. Deluke, 23 U.2d 74, 45H

966 (1969); Davis v. Barrett, 24 U.2d 162, 467 P.2d 603,

(191~1

Huber v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 6 U.2d 15, 305 P.2d 478 (1956);
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water
P.2d 577 (1950).

&

Irr. Co., 118 Utah 600,::

The reasoning and legal function of summari!

rejecting such defenses was succinctly stated by Justice Crocki:
who, in Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366, 370, 482 P.2d 702 (1971),
stated as follows:
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue
at the trial cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal.
In Simpson v. General Motors Corporation this
court held that a party may not inject a new doct::ine
upon which to predicate liability for the first time on
appeal.
This cccrt stated:
. Orderly procedure, whose proper purpo se is
the final settlement of controversy, requires that
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1

a party must present his entire case
or theories of recovery to the trial
having done so, he cannot thereafter
different theory and thus attempt to
a merry-go-round of litigation.

and his theory
court; and
change to some
keep in motion

rd. at 370, cites omitted.
An earlier case specifically applied this basic rule of
appellate advocacy to prevent the assertion of estoppel as a bar
~the

assertion of the Statute of Frauds where there had been

ample opportunity at trial to amend and plead that bar.
v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730 (Utah 1951).

Collett

Appellants had four years

to plead and argue part per forrnance, but never chose to do so.
On appeal, Justice Ellett, sua sponte, not only proposed
the doctrine of part performance as an affirmative defense to the
statute of Frauds, but in fact the thrust of the Opinion found
that the sar.ie was disposi tive of the lawsuit!

It is incongruous

that an independent Supreme Court would not only propose a theory
of recovery, but without argument thereon, embrace the same as
controlling, even though not raised by any of the parties to the
appeal.

This anomaly can best be explained by the fact that

Justice Ellett felt that the trial court had, for whatever reason,
denied the appellants their day in court, he, having inadvertently
viewed only that portion of the record indicating that the case
was decided on motions for summarv judgment.

Had this case been

so postured, the Supreme Court could legitimately consider that
doctrine, if only marginally inferable from the record, to :::emand
for trial,

Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976).
The Opinion's final instruction to the trial court to

take evidenc<: "as to what was said and done" clearly indicates that
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Justice Ellett inadvertently felt the trial court had prev

.
ente:
the introduction of such testimony by summarily denying appe)),.,

.,

their day in court.

In fact, appellants rested at trial, and

their theory of recovery was

~ejected.

The novel assertion of part performance o n appeal car;
as a surprise to petitioners.

As this Court summarily

rej~b

newly raised defenses after trial, it begs the question that thi
Court should not position itself as advocate, both

rais~g ~

ruling on its own affirmative defenses.
POINT V
THE OPINION ASSUMED A HYPOTHETICAL CASE,
PLACED THE PARTIES IN THE HYPOTHETICAL
SITUATION, AND RULED:
JUDICIAL INQUIRY IS
NOT ILLUMINATED BY POSTULATING WHAT MIGHT
HAVE HAPPENED UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.
Counsel for petitioners has previously addresnd

t~

Court pertaining to the anomalous taking of judicial notice of:
hypothetical situation on appeal.

In essence, the Opinion con·

structed a paradigm comprised of five fictions:
( 1)
That the parties did not intend further negotia·
tions on the boundaries when contracting on January 2, rn:

(2) That the "boundaries", whether stone walls M~
fences, were sufficient to enable a proper judicial deter·
mination of their nature.
(3) That there had been a meeting of the minds oo~
contractual terms as to the nature and extent of those
boundaries.
( 4)
That the fact that the sellers knew of buyers'
sporadic occupation of the homes constituted the formers'
consent to the same.

.
(5) That tae
seilers
should not prevai, 1 , h av ing stcc
,~
idly by waiting for the materialization of a "mighty win
fall".
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With regard to the above, the trial court, after hearing
all the testimony preferred by appellants, eliminated as a finding
~those
~ly

fictions posed in points 1, 2, 3 and 5 above.

The

remaining inference not particularly ruled on by the lower

court is No. 4.

Preliminary to this discussion, however, peti-

tioners would again re fer the Court to Adams v. Manning, Campbel 1
v. Nelson, and Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, noted supra,

which all hold that peaceful occupation is not a substitute for
mutual unde:!'."standing under the part performance doctrine.
Regarding appellants' intermittent possession of some
rather loosely-defined areas not co-extensive with those parcels
appellants claimed below, the Supreme Court made the following two
statements:
Sellers were aware of appellants' occupation and possession
of the land and of their improvements of the houses.

By refusing to agree on the exact description of the land
sold and in which plaintiffs were placed in possession, ~he
seller could hope for a mightly windfall by selling it at its
enhanced value to others.
First, it cannot be gainsaid that the possession by appellants was
at best sporadic until the suit was filed in early 1973.
T.217:28-218:3)

(R.24,'!!4;

The above use of the passive voice, however, is

particularly peculiar.

A disinterested third party might assume

that Mr. and Mrs. Call placed the buyers into possession of the
homes and cert a in de fined surrounding areas.

In reality, the

Calls reasonably assumed that as Mr. Stauffer was employed in 1969
in California, the Stauffers would not be making plans to ilT'mediately occupy the property.

At trial, Mr. Stauffer offered D-13
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as his notification to the Calls of his wife's plans on 1 ,
eavir:
California, moving furniture and, in general starting renovat:
of the houses.

(T.85:2-14)

That exhibit, a letter drafteap,.

ruary 12, 1969, is in the file.

A cursory examination of it

reveals nothing about the Stauffers' intent to split up the,,,
'<J

with Mrs. Stauffer moving to Utah and making improvements,

Yi!·

(W] e are planning on going up this next Thursday the 20tt
We plan to be going into the houses and doing a lot of '
looking around
At trial, Mr. Call recounted his surprise upon di.sec,
ing that Mrs. Stauffer had occupied the smal 1 house when he vi:i
the property in April 1969 to negotiate the boundaries.
14)

(T.2Q:,

Mr. Call further testified that he never expected the Staq

to move in until the contract had been finalized.

(Id.)

Peti:J

do not contest their discovery of appellants' occupation, and r•
haps even initial indifference regarding the same.

After all, 1

petitioners also expected that the boundaries would be amicabl
settled.

But, to equate the petitioners' knowledge with an for.1

consent as part of a scheme to fraudulently improve their real
estate, is as logical as ruling that we as members of the Bar
consent to widespread world hunger, in so far as there are none
among us who lack knowledge of it, and most could do something
about it.
This Court has repeatedly stated that on appeals fro:
plenary trials, its rulings should be confined to matters appar;
from the record.

Further, the trial court is allowed a broad

·
· ·
· wei' ghi' ng the credi·
latitude due to its
a d vantage d position
in
· onv

bili ty of witnesses' testimony and in selecting that testim '
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1

c.h0

oses +:o believe in entering its findings of fact and conclu-

sions of law.

The O;?inion never states that any fi!ldir,g

was not substantially supported by the record.

3.S

entered

Instead, the

Opinion indulges in fiction upon fiction, constructing an imaginary
matrix or paradigm in which, were this the case, the appellants
would be allowed to prevail.

Judicial inquiry into what could

happen under other circumstances, however, is best addressed as
dictum and not as a fulcrum to elevate disagreement and ambiguity

wilie status of a contract before the Utah Supreme Court.

There

is no public policy to be served by creating an ad hoc ruling
without prior precedent based upon a mental paradigm of what the
facts might have been under other circumstances.
POINT VI
THE SUPREME COURT OFINION ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE
OF SUFFICIENT BOUNDARIES, EITHER FENCES OR WALLS,
AND ASKS THE TRIAL COURT TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE AND
DELINEATE THEM; NO SUCH FENCES AND WALLS EXIST ON
THE PROPERTY WITHIN WHICH THE PARCELS MAY BE
LOCATED.
The Opinion has instructed the trial court to define
natural boundaries as stone wal 1 s and wire fences, and on that
~sis with the addition of parol testimony "decide what was the

legal description of the land included in the agreement to pur-

chase".

The assumption that such walls and fences exist to enable

the trial court to appropriately make this determination is simply

contrary to both the parol and physical testimony in this case.
9

An

cnpt from the examination of the appellants' surveyor at sum-

mary Judgment is perhaps illuminating:
Q
Could you tell from the face of this contract, from the
legal description attached and knowing where those two houses
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-39-

are, could you describe with certainty and as a land sur.:
exactly what ten acres, collectively, went with t::ose t·,,.1
houses?
A
No.
I think it is impossible to follow natural b
aries all the way around both these two houses. Thereo:r.:
some natural boundaries adjacent to those two houses, bu'.
all the way around the property.
·~
So you' re saying that parts could be considered as,
natural boundary. What is a natural boundary, Mr. Day?·

Q

A
Well, anything that might serve as a property line·
a fence or a wall or a road or anything of that nature.·
Are there more than one pas sibi 1 i ty for natural boui'·
aries surrounding those houses?
·

Q

There are several different possibilities that estal·
A
lishes the boundaries of this property, yes.
(R.296 ati
At trial, some thirteen months later, it is understa:
able why the appellants did not call Gale Day, their surveyor,
the stand.

Further, the uncontroverted trial testimony of Marr

Mal nor, a licensed surveyor, was similar to that of Mr. Day, t:
is, that either of two radically different surveys were possiC:
ities under the terms of the contract.

In fact, as Mr. Day ir.:

cated earlier, the description can be variously platted due to1
paucity of fences and other natural boundaries on the ground.
The above becomes abundantly clear upon examination c
the fol lowing four exhibits, which should be readily available·
the Court in the Clerk's office: D-2 and P-18 primarily depict:•
manner in which U.S. Highway 91 bifurcates Anderson Junctionar
separates the smaller house from the larger.

A fence and ce~er'

indicated on the southernmost portion of those exihibits are J::i
,
on property ownea· b y Owen cottam.

Both exn· •ibi' ts clearly show'

but one of the fences and walls, either by depicting lines wit:
small x's through them or by the designation "rock wa 11" · T~a"
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fence not depicted thereon is located on the east side of U.S .
. hway 91 and runs basically east to west, north of where Parcel

P.19

No. ~ is depicted on D-2 and P-18.

This fence has been platted on

0_3 and the area adJacent thereto is easily visualized in an
aerial photograph, D-93.
A closer examination of P-18 shows a rather sporadic
scattering of fences to the west of U.S. Highway 91.

Appeilants'

designated parcel 2-A, comprised by parcel 2 and parcel 1 on the
west, follows fences, walls or other natural boundaries so rarely
that it strains credibility to believe that the Court could examine
that document and find the appellants' version of testimony believable.

Clearly, the platted dimensions viewed as solid lines are

not co-extensive with the few existing fences designated as lines
crosshatched with small x's.

On the east side of U.S. Highway 91,

the problem is even more severe, as there are but two fences,
neither one contiguous and one again not shown on P-18 or D-2.
Testimony elicited at trial confirmed that all the
parties knew the boundaries remained unsettled, subject to negotiation, and that the survey preferred by appellants generally
failed to follow any natural lines.

Further, a surveyor's uncon-

troverted testimony declared that, being familiar with the land,
ilie radically different descriptions as platted on D-3 and P-18
~re both possibilities under the January 2.

1969, document.

Ultimately, P-94, prepared by Mrs. Stauffer, illustrates but one
~~idea of the possible shapes of the parcels she sought to

purchase.

Her illustration is again visibly different from the

Platting selected by her surveyor, Mr. Day, in 1972.

As the
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surveyors both testified in the record that the determinat·

lOn ·

boundaries was impossible, it is incongrous at best to expect
trial court to per form this function.

As it stands, therefore

the remand not only requires the trial judge to fabricate bou;
aries which do not exist, but to compel independent minds obv'
·I
far apart to agree to those fabrications; the judiciary shoulc
cautious in eliminating the exercise of volition through

t~~

of contractual construction.
POINT VII
THE JANUARY 9, 1979, OPINION IN
INSTRUCTS THE TRIAL COURT TO DO
ACCOMPLISHED, THAT IS, TAKE THE
WHAT WAS SAID AND DONE TO PROVE

CASE NO. 15468
SOMETHING ALREADY
TESTIMONY AS TO
BOUNDARIES.

In its penultimate paragraph, the Opinion instructs
the trial court to take testimony as to what was said and done
not to discover the truth, but "to decide what was the legal
description of the 1 and included in the agreement to purchase.'
Obviously, the Court has inadvertently been denied access to
the designated transcript.

An Appendix attached to this brief

clearly outlines that at plenary trial, the lower court, over'
objections, received all of the evidence, both documentary anc
parol, preferred by appellants to prove the description.
Even after admitting all of appellants' evidence,
including that objectionable under the parol evidence rule, tr.:
trier of fact found the substance thereof nebulous, inconsiste:·'
and legally inconclusive.

'

On appeal, this Court mistakenly in

'·~

that appellants were somehow precluded from introducing eviden:
· t ions.
·
pro f erre d to prove d escrip
this true.

At no place i' n the record is

Insofar, therefore, as all the testimony a s to w~'
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•id and done
was S"

to prove descriptions was received, the nature
-·----

of such further testimony to be taken is clouded on

re~and.

Clearly, this confusing instruction is due to Justice Ellet having
inadvertently failed to review the transcript.
7he further suggestion of the Opinion, that the trier
of fuct take testimony and then decide the description assumes the
~rtainty

of that testimony and denies the district judge his pre-

rogative to disbelieve the substance of a witness's statement.
child v. Child,

8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981 ( 1958).

See

The lower

court, having taken such testimony, already found the parties never
~reed

on a final description, a matter of long-standing importance

between them.

Justice Wilkins'

statement in dissent is precisely

on point:
This case serves uniquely as an instance of appellate
insistence that a contract for the sale of real property
be specifically performed by the Court's supplying the
description where the contract does not identify and was
not intended to identify the property to be sold.
Beyond the prophetic sagacity of that dissent, the Opinion
also represents a unique instance in which once the bad faith of
petitioners had been hypothesized, it suddenly became true for the
Court.

Thereafter, the petitioners' version of testimony, believed

by the trial judge, no longer became believable or acceptable to

llie appellate tribunal.
~stated:

On remand, the instruction might as well

Do not believe the peitioners' story in this case.

POINT VIII
COURTS OF EQUITY CANNOT COMPEL AGREEMENT WHERE
NONE EXISTS; THERE IS NO I,EGITIMATE EXERCISE OP
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER A STATE OF MIND.
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At trial, all of the signers of the January 2 d

ocur,

who were called testified that they understood that the bounc:
would have to be settled at a future date in an amicable and
neighborly fashion.

The trial court specifically found that,

though negotiations ensued, the same were fruitless and the C',
eation of boundaries was never agreed upon.

The Opinion has:

instructed the trial court to "take testimony as to what was i
and done and then decide what was the legal description of~
land included in the agreement of purchase."

Thereafter,~

trial judge "should order a conveyance of that land to the
Stauffers

n

In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423

P.2d~:

(1967), the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated:
Specific performance cannot be required unless all ti
of the agreement are clear.
The court cannot compel the
performance of a contract which the parties did not mutua.
agree upon.
Id. at 493, citing Bowman v. Reyburn, 155 Cc
82, 170 P.2d 271 (1946) (emphasis added).
The Bowman opinion, referred to in Pitcher, explain<:
the logical and self-evident rationale for such a limitation:
citing Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 s.ct. 178, 42 L.Ec
584 (1897), as follows:

'Equity, ' this court said in Hunt v. Rousmaniere' s Adm'r:
Pet. 1, 14 L .Ed. 27, 'may compel parties to perform their
agreements, when fully entered into, according to their j
terms; but it has no power to make agreements for the par
and then compel them to execute the same. The former 1:.· 1
legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and in ~ts exe'.c'.'
highly beneficial to soc~ety.
~he latter is.without 1 ~ie:l
authority, and the exercise of it would be highly mi~
in its consequences.'
Utah courts have also rejected such judicial interve:
.

ti on disguised in the cloaks of equity primarily because it
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rl
i,

manipulation ot" a state of mind, be it deemed the volition, will,
~ ~ee

agency of the parties.

37 p. 589

(1894),

In Whitehill v. Lowe, 10 Utah 419,

for example, the Utah Supreme Court declined to

enforce a contract for the joint operation of a mine "upon the
basis to be agreed upon".

Id. at 590.

More recently, Justice

Ellett, writing perhaps what is now the lead case, discussed the
~inciple

in Jensen v. Bouwhuis, 577 P.2d 555 (Utah 1978).
In Jensen all of the elements to a contract, except an

~portant

~tween

provision for partial releases, had been agreed upon

the parties.

The trial court, nonetheless, granted the

purchaser speci fie performance.

Regarding the partial release

clause which had been previously left to negotiation, the district
judge indicated he would make the agreement, and, should the seller
stil 1 re fuse to agree, compensate the buyer.
!~er

In reversing the

court, Justice Ellett clarified the legitimate problems of

equity as follows:

The courts have never felt that it was their duty to
write a contract for the parties; and where the matters are
not clearly set out, courts of equity refuse to grant specific
performance.
In the case of Davison v. Robbins, et al., the vendee
was to select two hundred acres of land from a larger tract
which was properly described.
The vendee sued for specific
performance and this Court held:
. . . The issue was whether the description was sufficient so that there was a valid contract which would be
enforced by specific performance. This court cited
Scanlon v. Oliver, 42 Minn. 538, 44 N.W. 1031 wherein
the court explained the reJ.evant distinctions between
two types of cases.
In one, the contract grants one
party the exclusive right of selection, and the contract
thu~ provides a definite means by which the location and
description of the land may be definitely determined
without any further agreement of the parties.
In the
ether type, the writing provides that the particular
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piece of property to be conveyed is to be rnutuaJJ
agreed upon by the parties, i.e., the mode provd
the location and description of the land is the ~d
agreement of the parties.
In the Calder case th t
concluded that the writing constituted a valid a~·
enforceable contract, since the agreement provided,
the vendee was to select the land within a given ti·
and ~othing more had to be agreed upon between t~
parties.
In the instant action, the agreement in clear
unambiguous terms provided that the location ~a;
tion of the land to be conveyed was subject to t~·
future mutual agreement of the parties. This writi·
constituted a mere expression of a purpose to make:
contract in the future, for the whole matter was cc:
tingent on further negotiations.
The trial court"
in its conclusions that the writing constitut~ a·
valid, enforceable contract.

The trial court ordered tl:ie parties to agree ( somet
they did not do in the signed document or thereafter), ar
case they could not agree within thirty days, the j~~t
make a con tract for them which neither had ever thought c'
making; and if the purchaser did not accept the judge'H
of the new contract, he, the purchaser could get the moni:
back which he paid at the time the seller signed the Eam
Money Receipt, plus interest. No option was given~~
he is stuck with the judge's idea as to what terms they
should have agreed upon.

This Court wil 1 not compound the error by ordering specif.
performance.
Id. at 558.
The thrust of Jensen, that courts cannot

grant~&~

performance of contracts wherein important matters remain unse:
between the parties, is a fundamental principle of equity jun
prudence.

See also BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, No. 15593, an

opinion written by Justice Hal 1 and concurred in by all justic:
to the Court.

Simply stated, the judiciary may not draft

wt

parties important provisions explicitly left for negotiationo:

.
and the:
rewrite their contract under the guise of construction

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-46-

;udicially compel their adherence to a contract outside their
J

contemplaticn.

As stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d "Contracts", §242:

courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make,
or :::cwrite contracts because they operate harshly or ineauita~ly as to one of the parties, or alter them for the
b~nefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or,
by const:::uction, relieve one of t11e parties from terms which
he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he
did not.
The Stauffer v. Call Opinion does little more than to
!~roduce

the district judge as a third party to the contract

negotiated by the parties, who all expressly understood that the
boundaries were subject to future agreement.

The Opinion's :nan-

date that the judge "decide what was the description of the land
included in the agreement to purchase" loses sight of the lower
court's express finding that the parties never agreed on boundaries, despite substantial effort.

The Opinion, thus, not only

exceeds the bounds of equity recited in Jensen, but further compels
the petitioners to agree to a judicially imposed selection of
boundaries.

':'his is the very mischief that equity should rigor-

ously avoid.
CONCLUSION
Appellants' initial action sought specific performance
of a real estate contract which all the signers understood left
boundaries subject to future negotiation.

Nonetheless, one of the

appellants moved to the property knowing the boundaries were not
settled.

Though petitioners accepted payments, they did so with

~e canvi2ticn Lh~t the boundaries would be worked out.
t

iations er.sued and were fruitless.

'.rial

1

Nego-

The lower court, after plenary

fc•rnd ·::he requisite meeting of the minds on the cont:::-act
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had never taken place.

That finding is supported by substan:

all of the credible physical and parol testimony in the recor
Appellants conceded that their improvements were
aid in determining the boundaries; similarly,

o:

improvements~

panied by payments are no substitute for contractual underst··

(1

and assent.

After plenary trial, the appellants rested, havi:

had all their testimony proferred to prove boundaries receive
the trier of fact.

Appellants failed to meet their burden ar

their theory of recovery was rejected.
This Court, on appeal, reversed.

Taking judicial l!J

of rising land values, the Opinion's author hypothesized that
petitioners could have stood idly by, re fusing to bargain in:
faith and waiting for a "mighty windfall".

Not only were pet1·

tioners not afforded a hearing pertaining to such

notice,~·

substance of the same flies in the face of the record on app::
and findings entered by the lower court.
Having once clothed the petitioners in black wool,:
Opinion raised its own affirmative defense to the Statu~of
Frauds, part per fcrmance, and despite the legal inapplicabi!i:.i
that doctrine,

found the same disposi tive of the case.

The id

court should, according to the Opinion, take the testimony of:
parties and decide the legal description of the conveyance.

.j
this has already been unsuccessfully accomplished, the 1ower.
must now simply create a contract for the parties where none
exists and then compel its enforcement.

This caprice is clear

beyond the legitimate objectives of equity jurisdiction.
Ultimately, it becomes clear that the Opinion's aut'
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.

t

did no '
access

due to an inadvertent dishevelment of the records, have

to the trial transcript.

essence is
~

t~

The thrust of the ruling in

afford the appellants their day in court, something

fult had been summarily denied them.

~~ld

This inadvertent mistake

not be knowingly compounded on rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this~

day of February, 1979.

~r¥
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APPENDIX
OEJEX::TIONS AND DISPOSITION THEREOF AT TRIAL

Grounds

Objection
I:!

cro Bishop ' s "2\rrended
complaint & ?.ep ly

l:l 6 To Stauffer' s testinony
of Nov. 1968 r.eeting
J:S

l:l

RWr

Ti..'Leliness

Under adviserre:it (4: 29)

MDH

Irrelevant; :imrraterial

Denied-can be renewed
(18:29)

To Stauffer's testinony
of Nov. 1968 rreeting

MDH Parol evidence; vary con-

To Stauffer's testinony
of telephone conver.

MDH

1:11 To Stauffer' s testinony

Disposition

Denied (19:8)

tract; irrelevant;
:imrraterial
Relevancy; rrateriality
parol evidence rule

MOH Continuing objection on
parol evidence rule

Overruled (21:4)
Overruled on continuing
objection; renew if
appropriate (21:16)

1:28 To Stauffer' s testinony
of telephone conver.

MDH Foundation

Sustained (21:30)

!:24 To Stauffer' s testirrony
of Jan. 2 rreeting

MOH Parol evidence

Overruled at this poir't
(23:26)

1:24 To Stauffer's testinony
al:out OREx:::

MOH Docurrent speaks for itself

It rray stand (24:26)

1:25 To Stauffer's testinony
al:out the 10 acres

MDH

Overruled (25:27)

!:9

To Stauffer's testirrony
al:out contract

MOH Parol evidence rule

Overruled (26:10)

i:s

To Stauffer' s testirrony

MOH

Identity of house

Court restated question
(27:11)

~:17 To

MOH

Unresponsive

It rray stand (28:18)

~:22 To Bishop' s question
al:out 10 acres

MDH leading; asked and

Parol evidence rule; varying terms of contract

al:out house
Stauffer's answer
al:out 10 acres

~:6

E:1

hi

a.riswered

leading but
(28:25-26)

overrul~d

To Stauffer's answer
regarding conversation

MOH

Unresponsive

Court restated question
(29:71

To StaU::fer' s answer
al:out l::oundaries

MOH

Unresponsive

It gees out (30:6)

Io Sti:!uffer' s answer
al:out l::ou.ridaries

MOH

Farol evidence rule; can't
~lter written contract

Overruled (31:5)
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Page/
Line

Objection

By

31:12

To Bishop's question

MOH

Leading

let him'
(31:13) ·-.

31:24

To Bishop's question

MOH

Foundation

Sustained

31:29

To Bishop's question

MDH Asked and answered

31:23

To Stauffer's answer
about what was said

MOH

Unres;:::.onsive

Question :;·
Bishop 131·:

31:27

To Stauffer' s answer
about conversation

MOH

llnres;:::.onsive

Question r.
Bishop Iii~

34:17

To Stauffer's testirrony
about conversation

MOH

Irrelevant; i.mnaterial

Qtlestion :o·
Bishop (!)~

35:8
35:12

To Stauffer's testirrony
about lease of farm

MOH

Irrelevant; i.rnrraterial

Overruled

36:5

To Stauffer's answer
about conversation

MOH

Unres;:::.onsive

Sustained •.

36:18

To Bishop's question
<.J::out Exhibit 18

l10H

Exhibit not in existence
on January 2, 1969

Allowed fo:.

37:24

To Bishop's question
about alfalfa crop

MOH

Relevancy; materiality

Overruled.•·.

38:11

To Bishop's question
about farm land

MOH

Asked and answered

Allowed-wit;
trouble (]O:J

38:26

To Stauffer's answer
about conversation

MOH Unres;:::.onsive

Question rel
Bishop (Ji:.:

39:25

To Bishop's question
about snall house

MOH

Relevancy and 1TE.teriality
to contract

Overruled a:~I

48:7

To Bishop's question
about large house

MOH

Relevancy and rrateriality

0ve~ed1::I

49:6

To Stauffer's testirrony
about additions

MOH

Foundation

SustalJlec
"'"
'

49:19

To Bishop's question
about additions

MOH Like date identified

50:11

To Stauffer's answer
about buildings

MOH Unresi:ionsive

Question re:·
Bishop (50 ·

51:3

To Stauffer's testirrony
about boundaries

MOH No teS~L-U::'DY about
boUi!dari.es

Answer rra1·
tine (51:11
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CvenuJ.ea

purposes U

after discd
counsel

'"'
sustained J

. ..J

!/

Groilllds

To Stauffer's testirrony

Disposition

{;JOH

Foillldation

Question restated by
Bishop (52: 16)

';;a

Bishop' s qi.:estion
atout conversation

.'1DH

Foillldation

Overruled (52:29)

.2

ro Stauffer' s testi..<rony
a.tout ccnversa ticn

MOH

Unresponsive

Let him start his answe1

.S

To Stauffer' s testinDny

MOH

Unresponsive

Court restated question
(53:19)

MOH

Relevance and materiality

Overruled (54:7)

MOH

Identity of fence teing
discussed

Go into it on crossexamination (55:10)

WRB

Foillldation

Sustained (57:15)

w"RB

Witness not qualified
to give answer

Overruled (76 :29)

WRB

Docurrent speaks for itself

Overr..i.led (84: 25)

21 To Bishop' s question
aJ::out natural boillldaries

MOH

Framing of question

Sustained (102:24)

22 To Stauffer' s testi.ffony
regarding conversation

MOH

To Stauffer' s testlirony

MOH

Object as to fo:rm

Overruled (105:7)

15 To Stauffer' s testirrony
al::out walk with Call

MOH

Parol test:inony to
change written contract

Overruled (108 :19)

15 To form of answer by
Mrs. Stauffer

MOH

Like to have her mark
directions taker1

No action (109:24)
(not fornal objectior,)

MOH

Relevancy and materiality

Overruled (115:3)

13 To Bishop's
question

;.JDH

Relevancy and materiality

Overruled (115:16)

25 To BishoF'
5 questicn

i·1DII

Parnl evidence rnle;
statute of frauds

Overnlled (115 : ~ 7 J

MDH

What is parcel l

Bishop restated questic:n
(117:17)

.3

a.tout cGff/ersation

_

(53:13)

a.tout conversation

!9

To Bishop' s request

that witness rrark exhibit
To Stuaffer' s testirrony

al:x:Jut feoce line

l

To publication of C2.ll' s

deposition
7 To Hughes' question
al:x:Jut R.E. contracts

1

!l

To Stauffer' s testinDny

al::out letter to Call

It goes out (103:24)

regarding visit of Call

To Stauffer' s testirrony
aJ::out sale of farm

lO

·;'~ Stauffer's testlironv
·~I

condition of Parcel-1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page/
Line

123:5

~

To introduction of

Grounds

By

MDH

Relevancy and rrateriality

141:27 To Stauffer's testinony
al::out purchase price

MDH

Hearsay

OverruJ.ed :~8

144:25

To Stauffer's testinony
al::out fences

WRB

Already answered

Overruled

162:4

To rrore testinony al::out

WRB Cumulative

photographs

µ1

Sustained i ill

boundaries
165:13

To rrore testinony al::out
who determined boundary

\\'PB

Asked and answered

The anS111:r;P4
(165:17)

174:14

To introduction of

WRB

Diagram inaccurate and
and therefore misleading

Overruled , 134
and misleci1

Exhibit 94

reu:P5

178:16

To introduction of
Exhibit 93

WRB

Relevancy

Court
ruling

180:12

To Bishop's Arrended
Corrplaint & Reply

RWI'

Tirreliness (objection
rrade at start of trial)

Bishop wieJ

to arre.ixl. :
to grant o:~
(180 :12)

195:4

To introduction of
Exhibit 93 (178:16)

WRB

Relevancy

200:9

To Hughes' question
on fann land

WRB

Repetitious

205:16

To Thompscn's questions
al::out contract

WRB Cross-examining witness

205:27

To Thompson's questions
al::out contract

WRB

13

~

Overruled ' 14:

Overrule:i

:fo

Repetitious

overruled iejs;

215:11 To Thompson's question
al::out deposition

WW

216: 1

To Thompson's question
al::out deposition

WW

Repetitious

221:14

To Stauffer's testinony
al::out residence in 1973

~'lr

Irrelevant,

225:15

To Call's testirrony
al::out conversation

WlIB Unresponsive

226:20

36

~'11r.aterial

To Call's testirrony
al::out conversation
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overrJled

.:k

Grounds

CbJection

DispJsition

Leading

Sustained (228:4)

'NRB

Unresponsive

Court restated question
(228:14)

il:ll To call' s testirrony
atout rreeting

WRB

Stating conclusions

Sustai.~ed

ll:i 7 To Thompson's question
atout rreeting

WRB

Leading

Overni.led (231:19)

To call' s testirrony
atout contract

WRB

Conclusion

Stricken (234:3)

14:18 To Call' s testirrony
atout conversation

\'ffiB

Who said what

It may stand (234:20)

15:14 To Call' s testirrony
alxlut conversation

WRB Wants to know what they

16:23 To call' s testirrony
alxlut farm ground

WRB

Question restated by
Thompson (236:25)

WRB Leading

Sustained (239:8)

WRB Leading and foundation

Sustained (245:4)

!8:3

To 'I'hompson' s question
atout rreeting

!8:~0

To call' s test:!Jrony
atout rreeting

14 :2

l9:7

15:1

asked

To Thompson's question

(228:13)

Question restated by
Thompson (235:17)

alxlut toundary
To Thompson's question
alxlut f"rrn ground

ii:22 To Thompson's question
alxlut farm ground

\'ffiB

Foundation

Sustained (246:23)

18:14 To Thompson's question
alxlut farm fence

\'ffiB

Leading

Overruled (248:22)

i0:18 To Thompson's question
alxlut agreerrent on farm

WRB

Conclusion

Overruled (250:19)

i3:12 To Thompson's question
alxlut toundaries

w"'RB

Repetitious

Overruled (253:14)

Irrelevant; imrraterial

Overruled on cross
(256:8)

Wants to know when this
discussion occurred

Answer may stand

Jl.fter tirre lawsuit filed

Overruled (264:18)

i6:5

To Bishop' s questicn
alxlut residents

o4:4

To Bishop's question

.RWI'

al:out agree..rrent

o4:16 To Bishop's question
al:out agreenent 8/15/73

Rl'll'

(264;8)

To Bishop Is cf.teStion
RWI' Irrelevant; i.rrrnawrial
Overruled (267 :22)
al:xiut sale to Sunset Co rp.
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Page/
Line

Objection

Grounds

~

268:17

To call's testirrony
about Sunset Corp. sale

?-WI'

269:22

To Bishop's question
about future benefit

Rwr

284:30

To introduction of any
evidence of Esplin
on rresne rents

\·JRB

Four.dation

Disr<,

~

AlloWed tc·.
Bishoo reo·
(269 :29) ··1

i.Jot in pleadings
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Sustainea· ·I

FOOTNOTES
1/ Child v. Child, 8 U.2J 261, 268, 332 P.2d 981 (1958).

2/ Finding of Fact No. 4 / R. 259.
3/ Finding of Fact No. 7 / R. 259.

4/ Finding of Fact No. 9, R. 260.

5/ Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 261.
6/ That this might occur at least on one case when over 600
appeals are filed yearly is to be expected.
7/ Finding of Fact No.
13' R. 261.

y

Finding of Fact No. 7' R. 260.

21 See Justice Hall's opinion in Hidden Meadows Development
company v. Dee Mills, et al., at p. 3, Nos. 15027, 15157, 15188,
filed January 2, 1979.
lO/ See Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d 61 at 63, 362 P.2d 427
( 1961) where in the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated:

A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract
is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties,
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly,
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.
Under the
circumstances shown to exist here, where there was simply
some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be
entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate
the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and
enforce it.
See also Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 179, 42 L.Ed.
584 (1897); and 17 Arn.Jur.2d "Contracts" §18.

ll! Defendants-respondents' Exhibits 15 and 93 are aerial
photographs of the property, while the plat map marked as Plaintiffs' Exhi~it 19 represents the Calls' total ownership in graphic
form.
l?_!

The Court finds that Russell Call made several trips to
Utah each year between ...•a:rnary 2, 1969, and the filing of this
lawsuit i~ March of 1973, and that on several occasions boundaries
were discussed but no subsequent agreement, oral or otherwise, was
ever reach~d that resolved the ambiguities.
Finding of Fact No. 7.

D_/ See
Davison v.

Ro~bins,

30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973).
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..!_ii Petitioners are not unmindful that "tenor" has a .
legal definition.
In the evidentiary scheme, however th~
.
.
' e I·
of the word comports with its more commonly accepted mean'·,
ina

121 E. Wa:(ne Thode,. "The In~efensible Use of the Hypou
Case to Determine Cause in Fact,
146 Texas Law Review 42J i'.
1..§_/ See also, Carr v .. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 23 Utah ,
1

464 P. 2d 580 (1970); and Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah
431 P.2d 126 (1967).

le:

1

.

l]_/ See Appendix.

l!!I Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, soa:
538 (1973); State, by and through Road Commission, v. Larkin,
Otah 2d 395, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utahi:,
482 P.2d 702 (1970); In Re Ekker's Estate, 19 Utah 2nd 414,:,
485 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 [!

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do herel.:y certify that on the
1979

day of February,

, I caused the foregoing BRIEF FOR PETITION ON REHEARING to be

served upon \Ellard R. Bishop, Esq., counsel for appellants, by
having two copies thereof delivered to his office at 172 North
Main street, Cedar City, Utah 84720.
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